Dark Capabilities: Effects Based Operations for Tech Companies

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- Principal at **Kopidion**

The Problem

Fighting a defense-only forever war against cyber threat actors is a losing strategy.

Offensive actions (AKA Hack Back) against adversaries in cyberspace is often considered unlawful or unethical.

Our Thesis

Binary ideas of offense vs defense are usually oversimplified.

There are many shades of gray.

Towards a Solution

Companies can and have created effects on adversaries.

There is a spectrum of Effects Based Operations.

Adopting an EBO mindset will allow companies to push back, individually and collectively.

Our Ultimate Goal

Turn the fraught binary hack back debate into an actionable Effects Based Operations mindset

Why EBO?



Effects-Based Operations (EBO)

Taking actions designed to achieve specific outcomes on an adversary's behavior, perception, or capabilities, rather than focusing only on tools or tactics.

It shifts the question from "What can I do?" and "What can I blow up?" to "What effect do I want to create?"

- Force adversaries to **react on your terms**
- Create scalable advantage
- Multiply strength through **massed effects and collective operations with partners**
- Build lasting advantage by **shaping the threat environment**
- Provide options for reversible effects (like carbonite)



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
Riga
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Bucharest
Tbilisi
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https://www.google.com/maps/@52.9418265,23.000526,5z

A Spectrum of Effects

Endpoint hardening

IOC & TTP sharing

Threat hunting

Abuse reports

Defensive security & anti-malware work

Honeypots++

Block country IPs

Deceptive telemetry

Exit market

Deception operations

C2 sinkholing

Domain takedowns

App takedowns

Credential reset campaigns at scale

Account throttling

Public attribution

Disrupting attacker infrastructure

Protestware

Hacktivism

Expose adversary comms

Vuln injection

Sabotage

Supply chain corruption

Data destruction

What you do against financially motivated actor in **peacetime** differs from what you might do in **wartime**, and at **every stage in between**.

Anticipating the Hard Questions

Authority & Boundaries

We're **not** advocating companies conduct military-style offensive ops

Corporate EBO = effects inside their **legal, technical, and terrain** limits

Attribution & Confidence

Companies must adopt rigorous and tiered attribution

Match operation and scale of effect to the confidence level and risk

Spillover & Risk

Design choices focus on **minimizing unintended consequences**

Complementarity

Goal: complement, not conflict with government operations

Companies can rapidly impose effects that buy time and raise adversary costs

Government retains primacy for coercive or escalatory effects

Capabilities



Our definition: Hidden or unconventional technical capacities that an organization does not publicly acknowledge or routinely employ, which can be repurposed for coercive, disruptive, or offensive effects beyond their intended or advertised use.

These capabilities **aren't necessarily US capabilities.** How they might be used and by whom is critically important to assessing risk and potential consequences.

What **full spectrum** capabilities do companies possess?

Offensive Capability	Corporate Superpower	Example Technologies & Services
Spying/Intelligence Collection	Access to Full Email Cleartext	Large Email Services
	Scanning of Computer Files	Anti-Virus, Operating Systems
	Devices with Microphones and Location Tracking	Mobile Phones, Cars
	Mapping of People's Relationships	Social Media, Mobile Phones
Real World Mapping and Reconnaissance	Devices with Cameras	Laptops, Mobile Phones (including citizen reporting via apps), Cars, Drones, Vacuums
	Infrastructural Cameras	CCTV, Smart Cities Infrastructure
	Robots that Map Physical Spaces	Vacuums, Cars, Delivery Drones
Influence Operations	Prioritizing Content that People See	Search Engines, Social Media
Gaining Access to Networks/Infrastructure	Backdoors Deployed Inside Networks	Lightbulbs, IOT, Infrastructure & Software
Denying Access to Services/Infrastructure	Selective/Targeted Outages	Satellite Internet Services, and everything else
Supply and Logistics	Moving People and Objects	Rideshare Services, Delivery Drones
	Manipulate Supply Chains (Deny or Modify Items)	Online Retailer, Shipping Company
Arresting People	Capturing and Moving People	Robot Taxis, also vulnerable CAN bus in cars?
Destroying Things	Destroying Data	Backdoored Open Source Project
	Destroying Real World Objects	Robot Taxis, Drones

When are you allowed to use capabilities?

ASPEN DIGITAL

ON THE SAME PAGE

A COMMON LANGUAGE FOR UNDERSTANDING OFFENSIVE CYBER ACTION



Kemba Walden
President, Paladin Global Institute
Former acting United States National Cyber Director

https://www.aspendigital.org/blog/understanding-offensive-cyber-action/

Defines three classes of capabilities

Passive Cyber Defense

Passive measures we take within our networks to achieve improved resilience.

Examples: *Patching vulnerabilities, deploying MFA, encrypting data*

Active Cyber Defense

Neutralizing or disrupting cyber threats within or at the perimeter of one's own networks. These measures are confined to a defender's own systems or third-party systems that give consent or authority to a defender to protect that third-party system and are sufficiently limited to avoid violating the Cyber Fraud and Abuse Act.

Examples: *Threat hunting, honeypots, disrupting adversary operations within the defender's infrastructure.*

Cyber Offense

Actions taken by stakeholders that have effects that are external to their own networks. Cyber offense includes a range of action from cyber scanning resulting in minimal effects to cyber force resulting in severe physical effects. The paper defines four classes of offensive actions with:

(1) minimal effects
(2) informational effects
(3) disruptive or damaging effects
(4) potentially lethal effects

Are we on the same page?

Where we agree:

“Conflating active defense with offense leads to legal confusion and operational hesitation. Treating all defensive measures as equivalent ignores the spectrum of capabilities available to network defenders.”

However:

The distinction between “on your network” and “external to your network” is an abstract idea that doesn’t map entirely to the technical reality.

Example #1 – RST Injection



- An actor on the network the the ability to observe TCP sequence numbers can close connections by injecting a TCP RST.
- Originally an attack technique on broadcast ethernet networks
- One of the first active defense technique by Intrusion Detection Systems in the late 1990's
- Sends a packet to the attacker's computer that shuts a connection down.

Is this Internal or External?

What are the risks of doing this?

- Target confidence?
- Who triggers the effect?
- Scope of effects?
- Legal?

Example #2 – Infrastructure Intelligence Collection

Sophos mounted counter-offensive operation to foil Chinese attackers

Sophos conducted defensive and counter-offensive operation over the last five years with multiple interlinked nation-state adversaries based in China targeting perimeter devices, including Sophos Firewalls.

- Sophos added product telemetry vs. Chinese state actor
- Product and Infrastructure companies can do a lot as long as it isn't against their EULAs (**and they can change their EULAs**)

Is this Internal or External?

What are the risks of doing this?

- Target confidence? (**low, affects everyone with product**)
- Who triggers the effect? (**attacker initiated**)
- Scope of effects? (**limited to revealing IP address**)
- Legal? (**according to the EULA**)

Example #3 – AI Company Response Poisoning

- AI companies can intentionally poison replies to known threat actors.
- May include incorrect answers to questions or misdirection that slows attacks down.
- Could include providing bad vibe code with canaries and vulnerabilities included.

Is this Internal or External?

What are the risks of doing this?

- Target confidence? (**High**)
- Who triggers the effect? (**Attacker uses responses**)
- Scope of effects? (**Depends**)
- Legal? (**Covered by EULA?**)

Example #4 – Canary Tokens



Is this Internal or External?

What are the risks of doing this?

- Target confidence? (**Medium - the actor had to open the file**)
- Who triggers the effect? (**Attacker initiated**)
- Scope of effects? (**Limited to revealing IP address**)
- Legal? (**Within CFAA "scope of authorization"**)

Why is this situation different if the canary exploited a vulnerability in the browser or document reader?

- "Authorized access"
- Is there a bright line between intended and actual "authorization scope"?

https://canarytokens.org/nest/

Example # 5 – LLM Injection



Is this Internal or External?

What are the risks of doing this?

- Target confidence? (**Medium - the actor has to interact with my computer using an LLM**)
- Who triggers the effect? (**Attacker initiated**)
- Scope of effects? (**Could be limited to collecting and IP or could be destructive**)
- Legal? (**Intended vs actual Authorization Scope**)

https://github.com/pasquini-dario/project_mantis

Key insights from the examples

Risk = Target Confidence x Trigger Source x Effect x Legal Authority

Example	External or Internal	Target Confidence	Trigger Source	Effect	Authority	Risk
RST packet	External	High	Defender	Narrow	Clear	Low
Infrastructure Intel	External	Low	Attacker	Narrow	Clear	Low
Poison LLM Replies	Internal	High	Attacker	Depends	Probably?	Medium
Canary Tokens	External	Medium	Attacker	Narrow	Clear	Low
Canary Exploits	External	Medium	Attacker	Depends	None	High
LLM Injection	Internal	Medium	Attacker	Depends	Probably not?	High
Exploiting C&C Service	External	High	Defender	Depends	None	High
Exploiting Attacker Host Infrastructure	External	Medium	Defender	Depends	None	High

The legal risk has more impact here than any of the other variables, and therefore may be miscalibrated.

What if the law hinged on trigger source and effect rather than on authorization scope?

Collective Operations



Collective effects based operations is a team of partners who combine their capabilities and authorities to:

- Prevent surprise
- Defend more effectively
- Create effects on adversaries

At scale, collective defense exploits the network effect and can generate more capability than any cyber army

Collectives allow aggregation of capabilities, accesses, intelligence, and authorities

High levels of trust and increased sensitivity when dealing with partners

Examples: vendor-customer, sector, public/private, ad hoc…

Collective and Multi-Domain Capabilities

	Denial	Degradation	Exposure	Deterrence	Disruption
Government Affairs & External Relations	-	-	Publish registrar and ownership findings linking infra to actors	-	-
Security Communications & Visibility	Inject false data into adversary collectors to blind them	Flood actor data collection with decoys to slow processing	Release captured malware samples and C2 metadata	Publish reproducible fingerprints tying toolchains to actors	Run protocol-accurate honeypots to capture and neutralize tooling
Incident Response & Red/Blue Ops		-	-	-	-
Platform & Marketplace Controls		-	Publish marketplace transaction trails exposing monetization	-	-
Payments & Financial Risk	-	-	Publish traced flows and mule networks to expose laundering	-	-
Threat Intelligence & Engineering	Deploy host-level sensors at choke points to capture payloads		Release IOCs and build-time metadata that reveal toolchains		Seed traceable artifacts into software builds to break the supply chain
Legal, Compliance & LE Liaison	-	-	-	-	-

Company Internal

Collective and Multi-Domain Capabilities

	Denial	Degradation	Exposure	Deterrence	Disruption
Government Affairs & External Relations	**Coordinate CERT/CSIRT abuse to null-route C2 prefixes**	**Persuade upstream ISPs to rate-limit actor ASN traffic**	Publish registrar and ownership findings linking infra to actors	-	**Arrange allied access for time-limited remote forensic snapshots**
Security Communications & Visibility	Inject false data into adversary collectors to blind them	Flood actor data collection with decoys to slow processing	Release captured malware samples and C2 metadata	Publish reproducible fingerprints tying toolchains to actors	Run protocol-accurate honeypots to capture and neutralize tooling
Incident Response & Red/Blue Ops	**Sinkhole or remove C2 servers to sever remote control**	Break or misconfigure actor VPN, BGP, or routing stacks	**Capture post-exploitation telemetry from forward sensors**	**Share kill-chain evidence with partners to increase enforcement likelihood**	-
Platform & Marketplace Controls	**De-list malicious apps and revoke vendor accounts to deny distribution**	**Revoke TLS certificates to break encrypted C2 channels**	Publish marketplace transaction trails exposing monetization	**Announce rapid vendor-account suspensions to raise marketplace risk**	**(with allies) Coordinate marketplace takedowns to remove distribution channels**
Payments & Financial Risk	-	**Throttle or flag payment accounts used by affiliates to degrade cash flow**	Publish traced flows and mule networks to expose laundering	-	-
Threat Intelligence & Engineering	Deploy host-level sensors at choke points to capture payloads	**Manipulate DNS, BGP, or cert metadata to degrade comms**	Release IOCs and build-time metadata that reveal toolchains	-	Seed traceable artifacts into software builds to break the supply chain
Legal, Compliance & LE Liaison	-	-	-	-	-

Company + Non-government Allies

Collective and Multi-Domain Capabilities

	Denial	Degradation	Exposure	Deterrence	Disruption
Government Affairs & External Relations	Coordinate CERT/CSIRT abuse to null-route C2 prefixes	Persuade upstream ISPs to rate-limit actor ASN traffic	Publish registrar and ownership findings linking infra to actors	**Publicize synchronized takedowns to raise actor perceived cost**	Arrange allied access for time-limited remote forensic snapshots
Security Communications & Visibility	Inject false data into adversary collectors to blind them	Flood actor data collection with decoys to slow processing	Release captured malware samples and C2 metadata	Publish reproducible fingerprints tying toolchains to actors	Run protocol-accurate honeypots to capture and neutralize tooling
Incident Response & Red/Blue Ops	Sinkhole or remove C2 servers to sever remote control	Break or misconfigure actor VPN, BGP, or routing stacks	Capture post-exploitation telemetry from forward sensors	Share kill-chain evidence with partners to increase enforcement likelihood	**Execute forward actions that interrupt comms and staging**
Platform & Marketplace Controls	De-list malicious apps and revoke vendor accounts to deny distribution	Revoke TLS certificates to break encrypted C2 channels	Publish marketplace transaction trails exposing monetization	Announce rapid vendor-account suspensions to raise marketplace risk	Coordinate marketplace takedowns to remove distribution channels
Payments & Financial Risk	**Tag and request freeze of crypto wallets to deny funds**	Throttle or flag payment accounts used by affiliates to degrade cash flow	Publish traced flows and mule networks to expose laundering	**Publicize exchange cooperation and freeze incidents to deter use**	**Push exchanges and banks to suspend services and seize funds**
Threat Intelligence & Engineering	Deploy host-level sensors at choke points to capture payloads	Manipulate DNS, BGP, or cert metadata to degrade comms	Release IOCs and build-time metadata that reveal toolchains	**Leak attribution signals to raise actor operational risk**	Seed traceable artifacts into software builds to break the supply chain
Legal, Compliance & LE Liaison	**Execute synchronized warrants and image VPS and accounts to deny control**	**Coordinate provider access restrictions to slow actor services**	**Publish KYC evidence and provider responses exposing identities**	**Announce cross-border arrests and seizures to increase legal risk**	**Perform court-authorized takedowns that redirect actor telemetry**

Company + Non-government + Government Allies

Conficker Working Group: Lessons Learned

JavaScript library updated to wipe files from Russian computers

Package used by big apps now drops anti-war text files on desktops

Disrupting Lumma Stealer: Microsoft leads global action against favored cybercrime tool

May 21, 2025 | Steven Masada - Assistant General Counsel, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit

Google previews cyber 'disruption unit' as U.S. government, industry weigh going heavier on offense

There are still impediments to overcome before companies and agencies can get more broadly aggressive in cyberspace, both legal and commercial.

BY TIM STARKS • AUGUST 27, 2025

Listen to this article 5:53 Learn more.

Google's Washington, DC, regional office is seen at dusk on August 11, 2024, in Reston, VA. (Photo by J. David Ake/Getty Images)

Sophos mounted counter-offensive operation to foil Chinese attackers

Sophos conducted defensive and counter-offensive operation over the last five years with multiple interlinked nation-state adversaries based in China targeting perimeter devices, including Sophos Firewalls.

A Collective Operation Example Using Dark Capabilities

Rideshare Company

Robotic Vacuum Company

Smart Lightbulb Company

Infrastructure Company

Our victim company has obtained an IP address of a threat actor, with a canary or through product telemetry. Investigation of the IP indicates that it is an office Internet IP address in a foreign, threat actor nation state.

Coordinating with an infrastructure company reveals email addresses that were used to sign up for accounts from that IP.

Within the collection operations network, there is:

- A smart lightbulb company with several wifi enabled lightbulbs that check in for updates from that IP.
- A robotic vacuum company with a vacuum that checks in from that IP.
- A rideshare company with an account created with an email address associated with that IP.

Company Mission: "To disguise surveillance and adtech infrastructure as home convenience, one bulb at a time."

Introducing TronLum™
Smarter Light for Smarter Living
"Your lightbulb just got a sixth sense."

TronLum™ uses advanced **ambient awareness technology** to adapt lighting based on subtle environmental cues—like motion, presence, and even mood indicators.

Adaptive Presence Detection

Your light now knows when you're nearby—even before you touch a switch. Walk into a room and feel the glow respond with perfect timing.

Intelligent Room Insights

Optimize your routines with *discreet occupancy awareness* and *pattern-based adjustments*. TronLum learns your preferences so you don't have to micromanage your lights.

Peace of Mind, Reinvented

Receive real-time updates when unexpected movement is detected in your home. Whether you're away or asleep, your lighting system has your back.

Seamless Integration

Syncs effortlessly with your smart home ecosystem, enabling customized automations based on *presence*, *activity levels*, and *behavioral rhythms*.

Company Mission: To normalize autonomous surveillance under the guise of household hygiene

Vacuum Cleaner Robot

- Precision mapping for future intrusion
- Audio/video surveillance for intelligence, blackmail, ads or ideological compliance
- Covert mapping or jamming of EM spectrum
- RFID and Smartcard harvesting
- Control smart TVs, phones, or IoT devices without detection
- Disruptive non-audible sounds that influence humans and pets
- DNA collection and biometric harvesting
- Covert cyber or physical (micro) payload delivery
- Accidental “malfunction” to cause injury or damage

Mission: To slowly phase out human drivers, cities, and competitors, until all roads lead to us.

Mobile Sensor Platform as a Service

- Surreptitious mapping
- Stationary or mobile collection
- Sniff passenger tech
- Regular collection along targeted surveillance routes
- Video and audio recording across the fleet

Persistent Tracking and Targeted Surveillance

- Pattern-of-life data for riders and routes
- Track political figures, journalists, or activists in real time
- Send a specific car or driver
- Track users' locations before, during, and after rides
- Follow individuals of interest across multiple vehicles
- Provide surveillance data to regimes

Behavioral Control and Denial Capabilities

- Selectively deny or delay service
- Create false ride records
- Build behavioral, political, or psychological profiles of riders

Tactical and Physical Capabilities

- Coercive transport
- Targeted car crashes
- Route or destination "errors"
- Crisis or extralegal logistical transport

Transportation Shaping and Mobility Disruption

- Traffic on demand
- Block roads during a crisis
- Reroute traffic to favor business, military, or political outcomes

Joint Targeting Cycle



Actor's motivations and incentives drive desired outcomes selection

Actor collects necessary intelligence, decides which entities to target and their priority

Choose from existing capabilities. Actors can create desired capabilities, if necessary.

Assign team or individual which possesses the desired capability

The kill chain happens here

Were the desired effects and end state achieved?

Note: Each Threat Actor has their own wheel, including its own target and desired effects list

Based on the Joint Targeting Cycle, see https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_09.pdf

Using capabilities to create effects, at scale



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Using capabilities to create effects, at scale



https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_09.pdf

Tiered Attribution

Attribution (noun) – who did it

Attribution (verb) – when, where, and how you say who did it. This is a tool to create effects.

Several interrelated dimensions
- What are you sharing
- How sure are you
- How broadly are you sharing

Answers drive your targeting and effects decision making



Target Development



Figure 8-2. Target System, Components, and Elements.

Closely integrated with intelligence

- Center of Gravity (COG) analysis
- Critical vulnerabilities
- High Value Targets (Enemy view)
- High Payoff Target (Friendly view)

Target systems analysis (see graphic)

Target value analysis

Nomination and Validation

Prioritization

Outputs: list of targets, targets with restrictions, no-strike lists, and intel requirements

For more, see the Joint Targeting School Student Guide, USMC Target Development and Combat Assessment, and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

Coordination and Mission Deconfliction

Precoordinate: via Collective's Ops Center (or ISAC), MOUs, and 24x7 contacts, Vendors, …

Share lean target briefs: target IDs, effect, timing, method, legal basis, …

Deconfliction system check: query deconfliction portal; hold or rescope on conflict.

Priorities: life safety, active cases, critical infrastructure, legal obligations.

There is opportunity for public/private innovation here

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Pope_Field_Air_Traffic_Control_Tower_%289206250542%29.jpg

Using capabilities to create effects, at scale



https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_09.pdf

You are climbing a risk scale



Example Risk Management TTPs

Governance and Planning

Structures and processes that guide decision-making

- Governance playbooks
- Multi-disciplinary planning teams
- Risk assessments before action
- Define escalation thresholds and stop conditions

Legal and Compliance

Anchoring operations in law, regulation, and policy

- Route actions through lawful authorities
- Use compliance frameworks as shields
- Document decisions
- Transfer risk through insurance
- Allocate liability via contracts, partnerships, or outsourcing

Precision and Safeguards

Applying effects in a controlled and technically sound way

- Apply precision in targeting
- Separate EBO from production systems
- Pre-mitigate retaliation risk
- Test in sandboxes
- Validate with red teams
- Pre-mission rehearsals

Messaging and Attribution

Shaping perceptions through narrative

- Frame actions as defensive
- Maintain comms discipline
- Use controlled ambiguity
- Calibrate attribution and disclosure
- Employ attribution deception if needed

Resilience and Intelligence

Maintaining continuity, adapting, and learning from operations

- Monitor ops in real time
- Preposition recovery resources
- Assess intelligence gain/loss
- Model adversaries
- Leverage partnerships
- Synchronize with allies

Operational design choices

Visibility: Overt vs. Covert vs. Clandestine

Attribution Posture: Explicit vs. Ambiguous

Authorities: Routed vs. Organic

Collaboration: Unilateral vs. Coalition

Reversibility: Temporary vs. Permanent Effects

Precision: Surgical vs. Mass-effect

Proportionality of Response: Higher, Lower, Equivalent

And more… see JP 5-0 Joint Planning

Using capabilities to create effects, at scale



Actor's motivations and incentives drive desired outcomes selection

Actor collects necessary intelligence, decides which entities to target and their priority

Choose from existing capabilities. Actors can create desired capabilities, if necessary.

Assign team or individual which possesses the desired capability

The kill chain happens here

Were the desired effects and end state achieved?

https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_09.pdf

Giving Leadership Options (COAs)

COA 1
Quiet Defensive Option (Minimal Visibility)

Effect sought: Protect core business with minimal external visibility.

Actions:
- Patch, block, increase monitoring, restrict access.
- Avoid public attribution or announcements.
- Share intelligence narrowly with trusted partners.

COA 2
Collective Defense Option (Coalition Building)

Effect sought: Increase adversary cost by mobilizing industry/community.

Actions:
- Share threat intelligence with ISACs, industry alliances, government partners.
- Coordinate takedowns or mitigation with vendors (cloud, telecom).

COA 3
Signaling Option (Public Exposure)

Effect sought: Deter adversary by raising reputational or political cost.

Actions:
- Publish technical report naming activity.
- Coordinate with government for attribution or sanctions.
- Use PR/communications to reassure customers and shape narrative.

COA 4
Disruptive Option (Offensive-Defensive)

Effect sought: Actively frustrate adversary operations.

Actions:
- Legal action (civil suits, abuse complaints, takedowns).
- Coordinated disruption with law enforcement (sinkholing, botnet seizures).
- Cross-functional maneuvers (disable fraudulent accounts, revoke licenses, cut services).

COA 5
Strategic Resilience Option (Long-Term Effect)

Effect sought: Reduce adversary leverage over time.

Actions:
- Accelerate zero-trust adoption, redundancy, supply-chain hardening.
- Invest in counter-disinformation and customer trust programs.
- Shift dependency away from vulnerable suppliers or geographies.

Using capabilities to create effects, at scale



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

https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_09.pdf

What will it take to make Corporate EBO work?

- Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)
- Center of Gravity (COG) Analysis
- Robust attribution

- Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
- Risk analysis frameworks
- Operational playbooks
- Legal frameworks

- Targeting process
- Capability databases
- Targeting databases

- Organizational will
- Trusted people
- Collectives
- Careful messaging
- Lawyers that get people to yes, not no
- Supportive policy and law would help

See also…

Offensive Cyber Operations: Charting a Legal and Strategic Path Forward
Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law

Dark Capabilities: When Tech Companies Become Threat Actors
DEF CON 2025

Private Sector

Rules for civilian hackers
International Red Cross

On Cyber: Towards an Operational Art for Cyber Conflict
Kopidion Press

Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit

Google Sharpens its Cyber Knife
Lawfare

Aspen Digital: Playing Offense Project

War Planning for Tech Companies
RSAC 2025 and ShmooCon 2024

Military Doctrine

JP 3-0 - Joint Operations
JP 5-0 - Joint Planning
JP 3-60 Joint Targeting
JP 3-12 Cyberspace Operations
JP 3-13.4 Military Deception (MILDEC)
JP 3-13.3 Operations Security (OPSEC)
FM 3-12 Cyber Space and Electronic Warfare Operations (2017 and 2021)

Key Takeaways

Google previews cyber 'disruption unit' as U.S. government, industry weigh going heavier on offense

There are still impediments to overcome before companies and agencies can get more broadly aggressive in cyberspace, both legal and commercial.

BY TIM STARKS • AUGUST 27, 2025

Listen to this article 5:53 Learn more.

Google's Washington, DC, regional office is seen at dusk on August 11, 2024, in Reston, VA. (Photo by J. David Ake/Getty Images)

EBO isn't for rookies

First, adopt an EBO mindset, operations come later

To do this at scale requires commitment

Risk can be managed

Corporate EBO can help spur government action and government will likely want to partner

Everyone should ask how their company can achieve effects on threat actors

Questions

Effects-Based Operations are not about reacting to what adversaries do, but about forcing adversaries to react to you.

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Kopidion.com

Slides: https://www.kopidion.com/war-planning.html

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